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We report the effects of framing and default settings in annuity demand after conducting a 
survey-based experiment with over 3,000 members of a Dutch occupational pension plan. The 
participants were asked to allocate their real projected pension accrual between a life annuity 
and a partial lump sum. In particular, we investigated the joint effects of consumption and 
investment frames and gain and loss frames. We present strong evidence for framing and default 
setting effects in annuity demand. We also find robust evidence of individual characteristics of 
influence annuity demand, highlighting the importance of heterogeneity among participants. 
Framing and default effects remain significant when we control for individual characteristics. We 
conclude Dutch plan members generally welcome the partial lump sum option over full 
annuitization. Framing and default settings are generally capable of predictively steering annuity 
demand. The precise effect framing may have also depends on the institutional environment, 
which predefines the perspective through which individuals filter annuities. 
 
Keywords: Annuity puzzle, framing, pension annuities, lump sum 
JEL codes: G02, G11, H55 
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The low take-up of annuities by US retirees, better known as the annuity puzzle, has been 
intensively researched. Several explanations have been put forward, among them (Brown 
2007) “rational explanations” rooted in economic theory and “behavioral explanations” based 
on human biases in valuing annuities. The Dutch pension fund system, where the current 
payout is exclusively in annuities, is considering the introduction of a pension payout in the 
form of partial lump sums. This likely change is stimulated by the recent change in UK 
legislation that allows for the withdrawal of pension capital in the form of full or partial lump 
sums as an alternative to full annuitization.3 These (probable) reforms create unique 
opportunities to test important hypotheses about the US annuity puzzle in both the 
Netherlands as well as the United Kingdom. 
 
Standard economic theory suggests that a utility-maximizing individual with an uncertain 
lifetime would prefer to convert his or her entire wealth into an actuarially fair annuity 
(Yaari, 1965). This suggestion, however, differs greatly from empirical research observations, 
leaving economists puzzled about actual agents’ behavior. With standard theory failing to 
satisfactorily explain this annuity puzzle, more promising explanations come from behavioral 
economists, who stress that decisions in the pension domain are subject to a number of 
behavioral biases. Using prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1985), annuities are shown to be systematically undervalued by retirees 
(Hu and Scott, 2007). Individuals of lower cognitive ability especially tend to make mistakes 
in valuing annuities (Brown et al., 2014). One line of research focuses on the use of so-called 
investment framing instead of consumption framing (Brown et al., 2008). The key to the 
undervaluation of annuities is that retirees in the United States are stuck in an investment 
frame, in which the annuity is perceived as a risky gamble depending on their uncertain 
remaining lifetime rather than a collective longevity insurance scheme. Consumption framing 
would stress the latter with its focuses on a steady stream of income as long as one lives.  
 
Until now, the framing hypothesis has only been tested for the United States (Agnew et al., 
2008; Beshears et al., 2014; Brown et al., 2008, 2013). These experiments are characterized 
by two major drawbacks. First, the choices presented are relatively unrelated to the 
respondents’ real-life situation and, second, the specific institutional environment has 
probably educated and framed the US respondents in a specific way, stressing pension capital 
rather than pension annuities. Testing the framing hypothesis outside the United States 
allows us to evaluate its general validity. Since Dutch plan members are used to annuities, 
they are likely to evaluate them through a consumption frame and to be less sensitive to the 
investment frame. Researching the annuity puzzle and the framing hypothesis in the 
Netherlands therefore adds to the empirical evidence on both phenomena. In this paper, we 
present the first results of testing this annuity puzzle and the framing hypothesis in the 
institutional environment of the Netherlands, where people are used to full annuitization. 
                                                          
3 See Loibl et al. (2015) for an early evaluation of the new regulation in the United Kingdom on the use of accrued 
pension capital. 
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The choices are based on the respondents’ real pension accrual and on their own pension 
plans, to make the choices as realistic as possible. Unlike Brown et al. (2013), we find strong 
evidence of joint effects of combining investment and consumption frames with gain and loss 
frames. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
literature. Section 3 provides a brief introduction to the Dutch pension system and its 
implications for research into annuitization behavior. Section 4 describes the methodological 
approach, as well as the datasets. Section 5 presents and evaluates the empirical results.  
Section 6 discusses findings in relation to the annuity puzzle and the role of professionals in 
offering pension choice options. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 Literature review 
In a series of publications, Kahneman and Tversky challenged the theory of rational 
consumer choice when demonstrating that the stability of preferences is strongly affected by 
the frames through which prospects and outcomes are evaluated (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986). Describing a decision problem in terms of gains 
or losses and suggesting certainty in a situation of uncertainty (pseudo-certainty effect) for 
example are shown to reverse preferences. 
These concepts have been recently applied to explain the annuity puzzle. Since annuities are 
both collective longevity risk insurance as well as a financial product, highlighting either 
aspect will change how people perceive an offered contract. Annuities appear more attractive 
when framed as the former (Gentry and Rothschild, 2006). Another kind of framing occurs 
when people receive their pension statement in terms of retirement income streams, as 
opposed to total lump sum values. Benartzi et al. (2011) find that plan members receiving 
their pension statement in terms of retirement income streams are more likely to annuitize, 
other things being equal. 
 
2.1 Framing 
Brown et al. (2008) argue that mental accounting applies and annuities are evaluated as 
either just one possible investment among many (investment frame) or as only a smooth 
retirement consumption path (consumption frame). In an investment frame, annuities appear 
to be relatively unattractive, because their total payoff depends on an unknown lifetime 
length. Income from a riskless bond, in turn, will be independent from that stochastic 
variable. Additionally, the owner of the annuity runs the risk of losing the entire principle, 
while a bond could be passed on as a bequest. Since people are loss averse, this aspect makes 
the annuity become even more unattractive. Furthermore, annuities appear as poor 
investments because of fiercer liquidity constraints. 
On the other hand, individuals filtering annuities through a consumption frame appreciate 
the protection against outliving their resources and not having to cut down on consumption 
when living longer than expected. Loss aversion will further strengthen their preference for 
annuities, since the loss of longevity protection looms stronger than possible gains from 
holding another asset (e.g., a riskless bond). 
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To put respondents in a consumption or investment frame in experiments, Brown et al. 
(2008) alter the vocabulary used in explaining a specific decision problem. For the 
investment frame, the decision problem is explained in investment-related language, using 
words such as invest, risk, return, and payoff. For the consumption frame, the language 
avoids anything related to financial products and instead talks about purchasing power, 
consumption payments, income, and so forth. 
 
Brown et al. (2013) combine the consumption versus investment frames presented to 
respondents with effects from gains and losses. They thus create four different frames, which 
are also part of our research: investment gain (IG), investment loss (IL), consumption gain 
(CG), and consumption loss (CL). Two behavioral effects are at play in the four combined 
frames: loss aversion and the pseudo-certainty effect. These two behavioral effects interact 
with each other and form the reflection effect (Fagley, 1993). 
 
1) Loss aversion 
Prospect theory suggests that, departing from a reference point, losses have much stronger 
effects than gains do and hence more potential to influence decisions (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Since losses loom heavier than gains, annuities are more appealing in a loss 
frame than in a gain frame. The figure 1a below illustrates the annuity position in the gain 
and loss examples.  
 
Fig. 1a: Loss aversion and the impact  
of gain and loss frames on annuity demand 
 
 
2) Pseudo-certainty effect 
The key difference between the consumption and investment frames is how agents perceive 
the risks associated with annuities. In a consumption frame, annuities are appealing because 
they are perceived as a certain payout (longevity insurance). In an investment frame, they are 
unattractive, because they are perceived as an uncertain payout, since the return depends on 
the remaining lifetime. Since the underlying risk is identical and only the perceived riskiness 
(certainty) is different, this can be seen as a practical application of the pseudo-certainty 
effect as implied by prospect theory. The consumption frame views annuities as a certainty, 
whereas the investment frame sees annuities as an uncertainty. 
 
3) Reflection effect 
According to the so-called reflection effect (Fagley, 1993), describing a decision problem in 
terms of gains or losses as well as suggesting certainty or uncertainty (pseudo-certainty 
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effect) can reverse preferences. People show risk aversion for positive gambles and risk-
seeking behavior for negative gambles. Hence, they will prefer certain gains over uncertain 
gains but uncertain losses over certain losses. To put it differently, they gamble to avoid 
losses but they avoid gambling to capture possible gains. Individuals are likely to show a 
strong preference for annuities when additional annuitization is explained in consumption 
language (certain gain). When investment language is used, additional annuitization is 
perceived as an uncertain gain. Individuals then will be more inclined to enlarge their lump 
sum position (certain gain). On the other hand, explaining the effects of lower annuitization 
in investment language is experienced as an uncertain loss and agents will be inclined to 
gamble by holding or more probably by enlarging their annuity position (uncertain loss). 
Less annuitization explained in consumption language is perceived as a certain loss. 
Individuals prefer to take a gamble by moving to the risky position of more lump sum 
(uncertain loss).  
The figure 1b illustrates the changes in the initial annuity positions in the loss resp. gain 
frames (dotted lines) by the interaction of gain and loss examples with investment and 
consumption language respectively.  
 
Fig. 1b: Reflection effect: interaction of loss/gain frames and  





Apart from framing, professionals may also steer individual decision-making in pensions with 
help of defaults. Since the introduction of the Save More Tomorrow program (Thaler and 
Benartzi, 2004) in many pension plans in the United States, defaults have become a tool for 
pension professionals and policy makers. If, at some point, partial lump sum payments are 
allowed in the Netherlands, pension professionals will have to decide on default settings for 
those unwilling or unable to make an active choice. This research does not take a position 
regarding the optimal default for a specific group of plan members, but it does aim to 
describe how plan members react to defaults. In doing so, the efficiency of defaults and 
responsiveness are addressed.  
The predictable effects of default settings on the lump sum take up are very helpful to place 
the size of the effects of framing in perspective. 
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3 The Dutch pension system and its relation to framing 
The pension system in the Netherlands is based on three pillars: a first pillar, the public pay-
as–you-go pension (AOW pension); an obligatory occupational second pillar funded system; 
and a complementary voluntary third pillar to provide for additional tax-sheltered 
retirement savings (Pensioen Federatie, 2015). 
 
The first pillar pension offers a flat-rate benefit to all residents at retirement age, regardless 
of previous income or employment. The gross benefit level is around US$1,700 per month for 
married couples and $1,200 for singles (2015). 4 The first pillar pension represents a 
considerable amount of retirement income at the lower end of the income distribution. It 
must be assumed that whatever annuitization behavior is observed, it will be partly driven by 
the relative importance of the first pillar. 
Participation in a fully funded second pillar pension scheme is mandatory for most 
employees. These pension plans are mainly run by pension funds and are independent from 
the plan sponsor. Pension funds in the Netherlands can be industry-wide funds, corporate 
funds, or funds for independent professionals. In the past, nearly all schemes were traditional 
defined benefit (DB) plans with fully indexed pension rights based on final salaries. Even 
though there is a shift toward average-pay DB plans with conditional indexation, most 
employees are covered by a collective plan in which accruals, contribution levels, indexation, 
and investment strategies are uniform among plan participants (Kemna et al., 2011). 
The third pillar comprises tax-facilitated individual pension products. It is mainly used by 
the self-employed and employees for whom no collective scheme is available or who want to 
build up additional pension rights. 
 
The pension law requires all pension payouts in the second pillar to be annuitized5. Various 
studies suggest that the welfare of citizens in the Netherlands might be improved by reducing 
the level of mandatory annuitization in order to address liquidity needs, precautionary 
motives, and bequests (Brown and Nijman, 2012, Bart et al. 2016). Pension funds 
increasingly allow plan members to choose variation of the annuity level. Lump sum payouts 
are not allowed, but introduction of this option is currently under debate. This study should 
help to determine the extent to which Dutch plan members will use the possible introduction 
of partial lump sum payouts and how professionals could influence and help individual 
decision making with regard to these new choice options. 
 
Dutch plan members receive annual statements on their projected accrual upon retirement. 
These statements do not indicate the total value of accrued wealth but provide an expected 
yearly gross pension income if the plan member continues his or her career at current salary 
levels until reaching retirement age. This has important implications for the framing 
hypothesis. Mottola and Utkus (2007) find significantly higher annuitization rates, when 
pension accrual is stated in terms of annuities rather than lump sums. Benartzi et al. (2011) 
find the same pattern and argue that this is because communicating accrual in annuities 
                                                          
4 Exchange rate €1 = $1.10 (December 2015). 
5 The Netherlands is the only country in the world with mandatory full annuitization of second pillar retirement 
savings, cf. Garciá-Huitrón and Ponds (2015). 
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promotes consumption framing, while reporting accrual in lump sums fosters investment 
framing. 
4 Methodology and data 
We analyze data from a survey-based experiment with a hypothetical annuitization decision. 
The stated annuitization and lump sum preferences are matched with an array of behavioral 
and rational variables, motivated through earlier findings and models. Observations are 
taken from a survey among participants of a large pension fund. The survey is personalized 
using proprietary pension plan data. 
4.1 Two-step approach 
The analysis of lump sum take-up proceeds in two stages: 
1. We first present the choice options as neutrally as possible. The evidence from this 
neutral setting allows us to draw a picture of the typical full annuitizer as well as the 
typical lump sum taker. This is an important step in our research, since this baseline level 
of lump sum take-up will serve as the benchmark when assessing framing effects. 
2. Second, we assess the impact of framing and default settings. Keeping other things equal, 
we alter the language and explanatory examples in the experiment in accordance with the 
four frames explained above: CG, CL, IG, and IL. Additionally, to place the effect of framing 
in perspective, two extra frames with different defaults are applied, one with the default 
set at a 0% lump sum plus a flat annuity (dflat) and the other with a 10% lump sum 
payment plus a high-low construction (dhigh) as the default Compare the next section for 
an explanation of the high-low construction. Assessment of the framing and default 
effects proceeds in three sub-steps: 
2.1. The level of lump sum take-up across the different frames and defaults is analyzed, 
giving a first indication of the direction in which the frames and defaults work. 
2.2. Regression analyses ensure the statistical significance of the results of item 2.1 and 
test the robustness of the framing effect to the inclusion of other variables. Control 
variables are introduced to the analysis. 
2.3. Finally, interaction terms between the frames and the other variables are added to 
the regressions from item 2.2 to determine the characteristics associated with higher 
or lower sensitivity to framing. 
4.2 The experiment 
The experiment is a personalized two-step allocation procedure. In step 1, respondents 
allocate their projected pension income to a lifetime annuity and a (partial) lump sum 
payment of up to 20% of the projected accrued pension capital. In step 2, respondents can 
decide to receive pension benefits as a flat annuity or opt for actuarially fair variations in the 
payout profile. They can choose either a high–low profile, where the pension payment is 
higher in the first years and thereafter lower than the level annuity payment, or a low–high 
construction, where the annuity payments are first lower and then higher than the level 
payment. Respondents were allowed to switch back and forth between the two steps to 
ensure they chose what they considered an optimal allocation. The second step was included 
in the game because both high–low and low–high constructions are available options in the 
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Dutch system. In essence, the high–low variation can be considered a limited form of lump 
sum payment. By looking at the two steps, it becomes apparent to which extent respondents 
are consistent in their preference for early/late cash. To avoid further complications, a 
number of real-life options were fixed in the experiment: the retirement age was fixed at the 
age set in the first pillar (67 years), partner pension reallocation was omitted, and the high–
low switching point was set to age 70. Further, the conversion between annuity payments 
and lump sum payments as well as among high–low payments is based on uniform actuarially 
fair discount and exchange factors as used by the pension fund, including gender and birth 
cohort-specific mortality tables. 
4.2.1 Methodological remarks on annuity experiments: Advances and pitfalls 
Two major issues concerning experiment-based annuity preferences must be pointed out. 
First, respondents’ decisions have no consequences in real life. Obviously, the stakes would 
feel much higher if this were a real-life decision. Hence, some bias may occur, since people 
may not put as much thought into their decision as they would otherwise. Second, the 
respondents may not be able to relate in a meaningful manner to the decision problem 
presented, its dimensions, and the hypothetical stakes. In fact, many annuitization 
experiments suffer from alienation bias (Hanemann, 1994; Whittington, 2002), stemming 
from the applied “one size fits all” decision problems.6 The setup of our study limits 
alienation bias, since it uses the individual respondent’s actual personal data provided by the 
pension fund on the accrued pension income upon retirement. The respondents should 
recognize the presented information from their annual pension statements, which creates a 
realistic scenario of choice options to which the respondent can actually relate. This is a 
major advantage over the uniform amount decision problems often applied in the 
experimental literature. 
4.2.2 Setting up the two-step decision problem 
As explained before, the decision problem is set up in two steps, each presented on a separate 
page in the online survey. 
 
In step 1, respondents are introduced to the allocation game. They are asked to imagine they 
retire at age 67, by which time they will have accrued €X in annual gross pension rights. They 
are told that they can decide on their preferred payout scheme in two subsequent steps. After 
a brief introduction to the two steps, it is explicitly stated that the first choice will influence 
the options in the second step and that one can switch back and forth as often as preferred. 
Additionally, the respondents are informed that the pension fund aims to adjust for inflation. 
Then, an example explains how a decrease/increase in the lump sum take-up affects one’s 
annuity payments. In the introduction and in the explanatory example, different respondents 
are confronted with different wording according to the four frames or with neutral wording 
with a pre-selected choice (the two default settings). 
                                                          
6 Examples of this type of analysis are: Cappelletti et al. (2013), who asked Italian respondents whether they prefer a 
monthly annuity of €1,000 to a variety of lump sum payments; Agnew et al. (2008), who ran a multi-period pension 
income allocation/investment game in which respondents allocated an initial endowment of €60; Beshears et al. 
(2014), who provided a lump sum equivalent value of $330,000, which was then allocated across different options; and 
Brown et al. (2008), who tested for the framing hypothesis in an online survey experiment with different choice options 
each worth $100,000. 
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On the same page, respondents are asked to take the first step and select one of five lump 
sum cash outs (0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% of total pension rights). For every option, the 
remaining annual pension rights are displayed as well. For an individual with €24,000 of 
projected annual pension rights, the choice options in step 1 appear below the explanatory 
text, as in Table 1 . 
 
Table 1  Choice Options in Step 1 
option Lump sum annual payment 
1 0 24,000 
2 17,100 22,800 
3 34,200 21,600 
4 51,200 20,400 
5 68,300 19,200 
 
In step 2 (on the next page of the survey) respondents receive further explanations on the 
high–low decision and an explanatory example that again differs in wording according to the 
frames. Below, they are shown 11 choice options: one flat annuity, which is exactly the 
remaining annual pension rights from step 1, and five high–low as well as five low–high 
schemes covering, respectively, both the upper and lower most extreme allocations currently 
allowed for by the pension fund. 
The ratio between the highest and lowest payment cannot be higher than 100:75, including 
the first pillar pension. Respondents can either select an option and proceed to the following 
questions or they can go back to step 1 if they are not happy with the options presented in 
step 2. Given that the individual chooses the second option in step 1, the options presented in 
step 2 will be as in Table 3. 
 
Table 2  Choice Options in Step 2 
 option Benefit during first 3 years Benefit from year 4 onward 
1 20,500 25,700 
2 21,100 25,400 
3 21,800 25,000 
4 22,500 24,700 
5 23,200 24,400 
6 24,000 24,000 
7 24,800 23,600 
8 25,700 23,200 
9 26,700 22,700 
10 27,700 22,200 




4.2.3 Frame implementation 
 
In total, we define seven different frames: neutral (baseline), CG, CL, IG, IL, flat default, and 
partial lump sum default. All frames are designed to contain the same amount of information 
and the same explanatory examples. They only differ in either the wording or the preselected 
default. For details on the wording, see the exact Dutch survey questions in Appendix C. It is 
important to note that all respondents were randomly assigned to only one of the seven 
frames (around 470 participants each) to ensure high-quality data with no interference from 
learning and spillover effects. 
 
The neutral frame uses neither explicit consumption-related language nor explicit 
investment-related language and only states the facts. The explanatory example can be 
interpreted either way, giving an example in terms of gains as well as in terms of losses, to 
ensure neutrality. It provides a hypothetical baseline level of annuitization for the Dutch case 
once partial lump sum payments are allowed. It also serves as the benchmark lump sum pick-
up for the other frames. 
 
The flat default is exactly the same as the neutral frame in terms of language and examples 
but adds one sentence explaining that, if the respondent prefers not to make an active choice 
himself or herself, the fund has preselected 100% annuitization (i.e., zero lump sum) and a 
flat annuity (i.e., no high–low variation). The corresponding choice options were preselected 
(pre-activated) in the online survey and could be altered by the respondent. 
 
The 10% and high–low default is a variation of the flat default. The only difference is that 
now a 10% lump sum payout and the second high–low allocation (where the pension during 
the first three years of retirement is 10% larger than for the remaining lifetime) is 
preselected. 
 
The CG frame differs from the neutral frame in terms of language and examples. The 
wording explains the tradeoff between lump sum payments and annuities in terms of 
spending and income and “money to pay the bills.” This frame is expected to highlight the 
longevity insurance component of the annuity. The examples explain how purchasing power 
can be increased and additional protection against having too little to spend during 
retirement can be gained by selecting a smaller lump sum. For the second step, this is 
accomplished by selecting a lower pension during the first three years of retirement. 
 
The CL frame uses the same language and terms as the CG frame but, instead, explains how 
one loses purchasing power and spending money when selecting a higher lump sum. 
 
The IG frame uses investment-related language, such as return on pension investments. The 
annuity is thereby expected to be perceived as a financial product with uncertain returns. The 
examples then explain how one can increase yearly returns by choosing a smaller lump sum. 
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The IL frame is again identical in wording to the IG frame but uses examples explaining how 
yearly returns will decrease once a higher lump sum (higher early pension) is chosen. 
4.3 Sample group and data 
The dataset in this research is derived from a survey run at a large Dutch pension fund. The 
survey conducted among its plan members had two purposes: First, collect a vast set of 
relevant variables for the annuitization decision that was not available in the client database 
and, second, run an experiment with a hypothetical lump sum versus annuity choice to test 
plan members’ reactions to partial lump sum payments, as well as framing and default effects 
in that context.  
4.3.1 Dataset 
The online survey was sent to 15,000 individuals who were randomly selected from a panel 
of active plan members available for client research projects. In total, 3,161 plan members 
answered all the questions.7 The average age of the respondents was 55.2 years (median 57.8 
years, minimum 23.4 years, and maximum 65.2 years), 72.6% were male, and 71.2% were 
married. The men earned an average yearly gross full-time income of €58,475 and the 
women €50,220, compare Figure 2.  Figure 3 projects the gross pension income from the 
pension fund, assuming individuals keep on working till retirement with the same 
occupational position (either part-time or fulltime). The projected gross pension income is, 
on average, €27,578 for men and €17,834  for women. In the entire fund, 51% were women, 
57% were married plan members, and 14% is divorced. The biggest age group is that 
between 55 and 65 years, with 57% 45 years or older and 29% 55 years or older. 
 
The sample is expected to contain a number of biases. First, male respondents are 
overrepresented. Since male plan members earn, on average, higher incomes, the average 
income among survey respondents will be higher. Additionally, there will be a bias toward 
individuals showing more interest in pension-related issues, since participation was 
voluntary. Since we use a number of control variables to address the expected biases in 
sample demographics, these biases should have no significant impact on the empirical 
results. 
Fig. 2. Income by Gender 
 
                                                          
7 To ensure quality data, those who decided on the first choice in under 2.5 minutes were dropped from the dataset. We 





Fig. 3: Distribution of the projected pension income by gender 
 
 
4.3.2 Derived variables 
From the survey, we distinguish four types of variables: dependent variables, framing 
variables (independent), behavioral explanatory variables (independent/control), and 
rational explanatory variables (independent/control). Below, only selected variables are 
discussed in detail. The full list of variables is provided in Appendix B. 
 
The following dependent variables capture the choices made in the two steps of the 
experiment, hence the stated annuitization/lump sum preferences: 
 lump sum take-up (which can take the value of one to five for a lump sum take-up of, 
respectively, 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% of total projected pension rights) 
 lump sum (dummy variable equals one if one of the four partial lump sum options is 
selected) 
 
The framing variables are dummy variables indicating the frame in which the experiment 
was presented. They are used to assess the framing hypothesis in statistical testing. The 
following six dummies were constructed: CG, CL, IG, IL, dflat (default set to a zero lump sum 
and no high–low) and dhigh (default set to a 10% lump sum and high–low). 
The rational economic variables are used as control variables to assess the robustness of 
the framing hypothesis. These variables have explanatory power when defining the driving 
characteristics of annuities and lump sum take-ups. Appendix B presents a complete list of 
the variables. Below, only the more complex variables and those constructed from multiple 
survey questions are explained in detail: 
 The variables high–low and low–high are two dummy variables indicating the choice 
made in step 2 of the experiment. The variable high–low equal to one indicates that a 
higher pension will be paid during the first three years of retirement than during 
subsequent years and low–high equal to one indicates that a lower pension will be 
paid during the first three years than during subsequent years. Note that, even though 
these are not standard variables in life-cycle models, they are expected to be an 
important factor in the Dutch context. Since the high–low construction is, in essence, a 
female male 
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less extreme form of a lump sum payment, a rational individual will recognize the 
trade-off between the two components in the overall allocation decision. 
 The risk aversion variable is measured following the survey-based approach of Barsky 
et al. (1995), in which people are subsequently offered riskier but possibly better-
paying job opportunities. According to their answers to these income gamble 
questions, respondents have been divided into four groups.  
 The variable discount measures the subjective time value of the respondents’ money. 
Patience in waiting for a lottery payout is employed as a proxy. The respondents are 
told to imagine they won a lottery that pays out in one year. Then they are asked how 
much of the prize they are willing to give up to receive the money immediately. The 
questions are the same as for Cappelletti et al. (2013) and sort the respondents into 
five groups of intertemporal discounters. 
 
The behavioral variables are designed to detect individuals showing difficulties in properly 
valuing annuities and are derived from the behavioral literature. Our research focuses on the 
framing effect as a behavioral bias. The additional behavioral variables we employ are control 
variables that help to assess the robustness of the framing effect and the relevance of purely 
rational explanations. The variables include involvement, trust, financial and pension literacy, 
decision confidence, education, cognitive overload from the decision problem, and regular 
debt on cash accounts. Appendix B contains the full list of variables with brief explanations. 
Below, only those variables constructed from multiple survey questions are explained in 
detail: 
 The variable involvement ranges from zero to one and is constructed from five 
statements to which respondents indicated their degree of agreement on a five-point 
Likert scale. The questions are taken from previous internal research projects. The 
average score is 0.84. Cronbach’s alpha8 to test for the reliability of the constructed 
variable yields a high outcome 0.73, indicating the respondents are highly involved. 
 The variable trust ranges from zero to one. It is derived from one question and 
agreement with three statements on systemic and pension fund-specific trusts, 
indicated on a five-point Likert scale.  The average is 0.57 and Cronbach’s alpha is 
0.81. 
 The variable cognitive overload ranges from zero to one and is constructed from 
agreement (on a five-point Likert scale) to four statements as brought forward by 
Agnew and Szykman (2010). The average equals 0.47 and Cronbach’s alpha is 0.84. 
 The variable Pension Literacy captures system-specific literacy through eight 
knowledge questions as previously used within the fund. They are combined into a 
score ranging from zero to one. The average is 0.78. 
 The variable Financial Literacy is an application of the measure and questions 
developed by Lusardi and Mitchel (2007). It is scaled from zero to five, with an 
average of 4.29.  
                                                          
8 Cronbach’s alpha is a measure for the “ internal consistency or average correlation of items in a survey instrument to 
gauge its reliability” (Santos, 1999). The measure ranges from zero to one. 
9 The relatively high averages for the variables Pension and Financial Literacies may be showing two things: Either the 
original questions are not suited to the underlying population (too easy) or the fund’s panel population is indeed very 
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5 Empirical results 
We first assess the lump sum take-up for the Dutch environment under a neutral frame (5.1). 
Then we evaluate how the partial lump sum decision is steerable for defaults and the 
framings and check the robustness of the results (5.2). Subsequently we conduct an analysis 
of interaction effects to assess differences in responsiveness to framing in a heterogeneous 
sample of plan members (5.3).  
 
5.1 Hypothetical lump sum take-up in a neutral frame 
This section only analyzes the acceptance by Dutch participants of the new optionality of 
partial lump sum payments within the neutral frame, consisting of 474 respondents.   
A majority of 58% of the 474 respondents in the neutral frame indicates to chose for the new 
optionality of a partial lump sum with an average lump sum pick-up of 12.3% (given a 20% 
lump sum maximum); 42% stayed with the full annuity position. Over all neutral frame 
respondents, the average lump sum take-up is 7.1%. 
These annuitization rates are higher than the ones reported in the literature on the annuity 
puzzle in the United States. These higher rates can be explained by the fact that Dutch plan 
members are used to having their DB pensions annuitized. In the United States, Benartzi et al. 
(2011) and Hurd and Panis (2006) report that US citizens in DB pension plans also choose a 
relatively high annuity take-up when offered a lump sum option. Furthermore, we refer to the 
study of Bütler and Teppa (2007), who find no annuity puzzle for Switzerland, with an 
average annuitization rate of 84.5%. 
 







                                                                                                                                                                                       
literate and therefore shows little variation. Defining what actually is the case, however, is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
10 A follow-up experiment using the same question set for step 1 in the neutral setting but a different sample group 
finds almost the same pattern as displayed in figure 4 (Alilovic, 2016). The findings of the first and the follow-op 
experiments are for the lump sum option 0: 42% and 40% respectively, for option 0.05: 14% and 14%, for option 0.10: 
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5.2 Steering the partial lump sum decision 
This section evaluates how the partial lump sum decision is steerable through default setting 
and framing. The analysis proceeds in three stages: First, the differences in lump sum take-up 
across the different frames are described and motivated according to the predictions in 
Section 2. We first discuss the responsiveness to default settings (5.2.1), then to framing 
(5.2.2). Second, standard economic as well as behavioral control variables are included in the 
analysis to check the robustness of the results (5.2.3).  
 
5.2.1 Impact of defaults 
The analysis of defaults is based on a reduced dataset of 1420 observations covering only 
those respondents who were assigned to either the neutral frame (474) or one of the two 
default frames (474 and 467). 
Figure 4 presents the extent to which respondents choose the default. Not only do more 
respondents (compared to the neutral frame) choose the preselected choice, but they also 
move closer overall to the default. The average lump sum payout is 7.1% for the neutral 
frame, 6.1% for the flat default, and 7.7% for the 10% default.  
 




5.2.2 Impact of framing 
Now we look at the impact of applying the frames. Figure 5 shows how individual choice 
differs (on average) across the frames for the partial lump sum decision (step 1 in the 
experiment). The effect holds for the share of those picking any partial lump sum option as 
well as for average annuitization rates (i.e., lump sum cash-out rates). The lowest average 
take-up is for the IL frame, that is 5.2%, and the highest is for the IG frame, at a little over 8%. 
This spread is much in line with the spread observed for the flat and high default frames, 
ranging from 6.1% to 7.7%.  
Furthermore, we make the important observation from Fig. 5 that the differences between 
the frames are exactly in line with the predictions implied by the framing hypothesis. In 
section 2 we explained how preferences are expected to change across the different frames. 
These mechanisms indeed can be observed in the data. Explaining the choice option with a 
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the take-up in the gain example (more annuities). Compared to the neutral frame, 
consumption framing evokes higher preference for annuities whereas investment framing 
stimulates a higher lump sum take-up. Combining the investment and consumption frames 
with the loss and gain examples lead to interaction effects. Gains are welcomed generally, 
activating risk-averse attitude. Comparing the two frames with a gain positon, we observe 
risk-averse behavior in the IG-frame leads to additional lump sum take-up whereas in the CG-
framed individuals are induced to increase their annuity position. Losses activate risk-
seeking behavior, implying an increase of the lump sum take-up in the CL-frame, but a lower 
preferred lump sum in the IL-frame.  
 




So, the overall impression is quite similar to what has been observed in the application of 
defaults: framing does matter in the annuity decisions of individuals and does so predictably, 
in line with insights from behavioral economics. 
 
5.2.3 Robustness of the default and framing effects 
 
This section checks for the robustness of the above results using multiple regression analysis. 
We assess both the statistical significance of default and framing effects as well as its 
robustness to the inclusion of other explanatory variables and their relative importance vis-
à-vis the frames. We apply different specifications of regression analysis. In each regression, a 
choice variable is explained by framing variables (dummies for each default and frame), as 
well as rational and behavioral control variables:  
 
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖𝛽𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝛽𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝛽𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 + 𝑢𝑖  
 
with i indexing observations, and where, for each i, frame is a 1 × k vector of all frame 
dummies and frame is the k × 1 vector of all frame parameters. The same vectors are defined 
for all standard economic variables (econ) as well as behavioral variables (behave) and u 
denotes the residuals (error term). Variables whose scales do not allow for a meaningful 
economic interpretation are standardized such that their means are zero, with a standard 




















model specifications are possible. We did start the analysis with a very broad specification, 
which was then diminished to what can be considered the best model. Not all of the 
specifications tested throughout this process of manual data mining are reported. We report 
a minimal specification with only the framing variables, one specification controlling for 
(rational) economic factors, another controlling only for behavioral variables, and a 
combined specification putting together the most relevant variables. We use logit and 
ordered probit model specifications for the regressions.  
 
Default effects 
The impression that lump sum take ups can be steered through default settings is supported 
by the regression results in Table A.1 in Appendix A11. The impact of the flat default is an 
especially robust result. Individuals experiencing greater cognitive overload and less 
confidence in their choices tend to opt for a partial lump sum. 
 
Framing effects 
Now we check for the robustness of the framing effects. Table A.2 shows five ordered probit 
regressions of the choice made in the first step (partial lump sum) on different sets of 
explanatory and control variables12. Note that, next to the frame dummies, we always control 
for the decision in step 2. Above, it is argued that the annuity choice will depend strongly on 
preferences regarding a high–low construction, which is therefore accounted for in all 
specifications.  
Generally, the earlier reported evidence (see Figure 5) is confirmed by regression analysis. 
Only the impact of the IG frame turns out to be insignificant compared to that of the neutral 
frame. However, individuals indeed do assign lower values to “risky” annuities in an IG frame. 
All other frames have a significant negative effect on lump sum take-up. This confirms the 
earlier hypothesis of the frames having an overall activating effect, making respondents 
appreciate their annuities more. 
We have argued that loss aversion and the reflection effect can predict the pairwise 
differences between gain and loss frames as well as consumption and investment frames. The 
regressions confirm these relative differences. The CL and IL frames more strongly nudge 
respondents toward annuities than their counterpart frames, CG and IG respectively. Hence, 
people are loss averse with respect to their annuitized wealth. Furthermore note individuals 
in the IL frame are more likely to choose an (risky) annuity (i.e., uncertain loss) than those in 
the CL frame (certain loss) are to choose an (safe) annuity. This result indeed suggests that 
                                                          
11 A logit model is applied. Binary (dummy) variables are used regarding choosing a lump sum (yes/no), choosing a 
high–low scheme (yes/no), and choosing a low–high scheme (yes/no). For some combinations of the independent 
variable values, a linear model predicts probabilities below zero and above one, which does not make sense, for 
obvious reasons. A logit model eliminates this shortcoming by estimating a logistic function, which yields values 
between zero and one for all real numbers. Because of non-linearity, rather than applying ordinary least squares 
techniques, we estimate the function using the maximum likelihood method. 
12 An ordered probit model is used. The variable to be explained in most specifications is the choice in the first step of 
the experiment, which ranges from one to five (five means more lump sums than four). Technically, one could also 
assign quantitative meanings to these values (0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% of accruals) and estimate a linear model 
using ordinary least squares. However, in terms of model fit and normality of the error term, a maximum likelihood 
estimated ordered probit model has proven to do much better and is the preferred one. In a similar context, this  model 
also has been applied by Cappelletti et al. (2013). 
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people gamble to avoid losses; they are risk seeking when faced with losses. At the same time, 
respondents are more likely to choose more (certain) annuitization in the CG frame than 
respondents are in the IG frame (where it is perceived as an uncertain gain). They are risk 
averse when comparing positive outcomes. Note that these results do not change across the 
different model specifications and are always highly significant. 
Coming back to the interdependence of the two steps in the decision problem, the empirical 
evidence is partly surprising. On the one hand, choosing a high–low construction is 
associated with choosing a higher lump sum. This result would be in line with the earlier 
hypothesis, that a high–low construction is, in essence, a less extreme lump sum payment. 
Therefore, demand for both options should move together if the preferences (for early or late 
cash) are consistent across the two steps. On the other hand, there is also a highly significant 
positive relation between the choices of a low–high scheme and a lump sum, even though the 
low–high allocation is rather the opposite of a lump sum payment. However, in a follow-up 
experiment exploring the same choice option between full annuitization and a partial lump 
sum, individuals are explicitly asked how the lump sum will be spent. Individuals in the 
neutral frame indicate usage of the lump sums for specific spending destinations, particularly 
for the redemption of outstanding mortgages and other debts (52%), travel (32%), to 
maintain a liquid sum for unforeseen spending (7%), home maintenance, and more (Alilovic, 
2016). 
The next step controls for the effects of standard economic variables on the variation in 
annuitization behavior. Specification B (Econ) in Table A.2 adds a wide set of variables 
relevant to a lifetime utility-maximizing agent. Much in line with the literature expanding the 
life-cycle model, the applied proxy for bequest motives (children) is positively related to 
partial lump sum payments. Furthermore, people trade off their wealth and debt positions 
against their annuitization rates. Higher wealth is associated with a lower lump sum take-up. 
Those holding long-term debt (more than 10 years) annuitize less, presumably to pay off 
loans and save on interest payments. Higher risk tolerance is associated with greater lump 
sum take-up. 
The specification also includes two variables on the verge of behavioral explanations: first, 
age, which has a highly significant negative relation with lump sum take-up (in all 
specifications). Hyperbolic discounting would imply that older individuals are more tempted 
by receiving the lump sum sooner than younger ones, who feel less pressure from postponing 
income to a more distant future. Apparently, this is not the case. Instead, older people 
appreciate annuities more than younger people do. One explanation could be an increasing 
reluctance to exchange one’s accrued benefits (note that this is in terms of annuities in the 
Netherlands) for a lump sum. Similarly, the elderly could be more prone to inertia and not as 
keen to make an active choice in retirement planning as younger generations, who feel more 
connected to recent trends toward greater individual freedom of choice. Thus, it will be 
interesting to see how this age coefficient evolves over time for the Dutch case as older 
cohorts, which are more DB focused, exit the sample. 
The second variable on the verge of behavioral economics is intertemporal discounting, 
approximated by patience for lottery payouts. The findings indicate intertemporal 
discounting is highly significant and positively related to lump sum pick-up. 
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The next specification in Table A.2 (C, Behavior) controls for characteristics capturing why 
and how people make mistakes in valuing annuities and hence make irrational (non–utility-
maximizing) choices. Surprisingly, there is no significant effect on choice behavior stemming 
from variables related to involvement or financial sophistication (newsletter, contact_fund, 
involve, p_literacy, f_literacy). What is significant, though, is the positive relation between 
perceived financial literacy (lit_conf) and lump sum take-up. Similarly, there is a significant 
positive relation between self-indicated ability to arrange for one’s pension (know_arrange) 
and lump sum take-up. From a social planner’s perspective, this is an important insight. It is 
not actual sophistication that drives active decision making about lump sum take-up but, 
rather, self-perceived sophistication. Another highly significant variable is trust. Respondents 
showing greater trust in the fund as well as in the Dutch pension system tend to take up less 
lump sum. This finding highlights how much impact fund communications and behavior 
toward plan members can have on pension-related decisions via the perceived 
trustworthiness of the fund. 
The combined specifications (columns D&E in Table A.2) mostly confirm the above findings. 
Interestingly, cognitive overload now becomes significant. It is rather worrying, though, that 
higher cognitive overload is associated with greater lump sum take-up, given that taking up 
lump sums and using the money wisely require greater financial sophistication than simply 
living off a monthly paid annuity. Note the relationship of higher lump sum and cognitive 
overload may be explained in both ways, the lump sum take-up being either as the clearer 
and easier option or as the more difficult one. This remains to be discussed in future 
research.  
Overall, the frame dummies appear to be the most robust of all the variables. No combination 
of control variables causes the framing variables to become insignificant. 
Conclusions 
The above analysis provides strong evidence of the general validity of the framing hypothesis. 
All observed effects are in line with theoretical predictions. Most importantly, it is evident 
that annuitization behavior is subject to framing and that active framing can have a 
significant impact on overall annuitization rates. For the underlying sample, framing 
outstrips all other variables in terms of robustness and explanatory power. Many of the 
variables that capture difficulties in properly valuing annuities are associated with a higher 
demand for lump sum payments. This result highlights the behavioral nature of the 




When considering framing as a tool of information architecture that can be applied to actively 
steer individual decision making, predictions must be made of how framing interacts with 
heterogeneity. Hence, the last step in assessing the framing hypothesis is to determine how 
the frames interact with other variables. This is done by adding interaction terms to the 
regression models. 
 
A similar assessment of framing in the Dutch environment has been conducted by van der 
Heijden et al. (2012). They find that only impatience interacts significantly with framing. This 
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finding is not supported by the evidence from our experiment. The four variables that 
significantly interact with the frames are discussed in more detail: Gender, Age, Debt, and 
Risk tolerance. Table A.4 presents the results for specifications including the interaction 
terms and the most relevant control variables (economic as well as behavioral). Insignificant 
results are not reported. Table A.4 shows the results when no control variables are included. 
5.3.1 Gender 
Agnew et al. (2008) find men to be more affected by framing than women are. In particular, 
men are more likely to annuitize after they have seen an annuity-biased slideshow, while this 
had no effect on women. After an investment-biased slideshow, both genders annuitized less, 
with women showing a stronger reaction. In a way, this type of experiment is similar to our 
research. The results in column A of Table A.3 indeed may be seen as partly confirming the 
findings of Agnew et al. (2008). The coefficients for the framing variables (CG, CL, IG, IL) now 
represent the effects of the frames on female respondents. The effect on men is the sum of 
these coefficients plus the corresponding interaction term. First, it is striking that only the IG 
coefficient is significant (positive) now, while it is not significant in the analysis when the 
interaction between gender and framing is not accounted for (see Table A.2). This result 
means that only the IG frame has a significant impact on female choice behavior. Once women 
are put in an IG frame, they show a much stronger preference for lump sums, which would be 
in line with the work of Agnew et al. (2008). Additional annuitization in the investment frame 
is perceived as risky (uncertain gain). Apparently, women now show very strong aversion to 
more risk and would rather take a lump sum in that case in line with the expected outcome 
for the IG frame as described in section 2, in particular figure 1. The difference from their 
male counterparts becomes even clearer when adding up the IG coefficient (0.37) and the IG–
male interaction coefficient (-0.4), which leads to a negative net effect for men. Apparently, 
male plan members show even more demand for annuities once these are framed as a risky 
financial product. For men the riskiness of additional annuitization within the investment 
frame is perceived as an uncertain loss rather than an uncertain gain, activating risk-seeking 
behavior and so more annuities.  
Additionally, men are not affected by the CL frame, while the overall population is (-0.32). 
Hence, it is mainly women who take up more annuities in the CL frame once they are 
explained that lump sum payments imply certain loss. The pattern here appears to be that 
women assign much higher values to the safety provided by annuities, while men are quite 
willing to take on risk in their retirement income. With respect to the CG and IL frames, the 
evidence reported on interaction coefficients and the insignificance of the female coefficients 
imply stronger framing effects (toward annuities) for men than for the overall population. 
Hence, the finding of Agnew et al. (2008) of men being more sensitive to framing is confirmed 
for the CG and IL frames but rejected for the IG and CL frames, which in turn appear to have a 
stronger impact on women. The evidence provided does not support the hypothesis of 
gender playing a role in framing per se. It is not the case that men are more responsive than 
women or vice versa. What can be seen instead is that men and women are responsive to 
different frames. 
5.3.2 Age 
After interacting the frames with a dummy indicating above-median age (57.8 years), older 
plan members appear to be more responsive to framing. All interaction dummies show 
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negative signs, indicating that the overall push toward annuities is stronger among older 
respondents. Again, there is even an inversion effect on the IG frame. While the coefficient for 
the younger respondents is 0.23, it is up to -0.12 (0.23–0.35) for respondents older than 57.8 
years. Once the younger are framed with investment language and uncertain gains in return 
when they would increase their annuity, they decide on the (safe) lump sum. The elderly, 
however, feel encouraged to annuitize in the very same frame. 
5.3.3 Debt 
From an economic point of view, it is utility optimizing to pay off loans by cashing out 
pension assets to save on interest payments (presupposing that the interest on loans is 
higher than the return on pension assets). Hence, loss of welfare will arise if framing 
discourages debt holders from doing so. The positive interaction coefficients in column C of 
Table A.4 however, show such strong values that they partly offset the coefficients for the 
frames. It seems that, if there is a solid economic rationale behind the decision to cash out 
pension assets, it is more difficult to distort that decision. Framing is less effective when it 
interferes with stable preferences derived from individual economic considerations. 
5.3.4 Risk tolerance 
Risk preferences and how they are subject to perceived certainty are at the heart of the 
framing hypothesis. Therefore, it is of great interest to see how risk tolerance interacts with 
the frames. Column D of Table A.4 shows how more risk-tolerant individuals are influenced 
less by the frames. The negative coefficients for the frame dummies are partly offset by the 
positive values of the interaction coefficients. Overall, risk-tolerant people are harder to steer 
toward more annuitization. This effect, however, remains only significant for the CL frame 
when control variables are included (see column D in Table A.3). 
Final 
The analysis of interaction effects has added one important insight to the framing hypothesis: 
Its validity depends significantly on the characteristics of the underlying population. With 
respect to the effectiveness of active framing, some characteristics have a catalyzing effect 
(male, age) and others a debilitating effect (risk tolerance, debt holdings). This result has 
important implications for pension professionals. Given that individuals are steered actively 
into predictable directions, understanding the population’s heterogeneity is imperative. 
 
6 Discussion 
The implications of this research project are twofold. First, they are relevant to the academic 
world and the literature on the annuitization puzzle as well as on the framing hypothesis. 
Second, they affect pension professionals and policy makers involved in the design and 
communication regarding the decumulation of pension assets. 
6.1 ‘Reversed’ annuity puzzle 
The predictions of the life-cycle model often do not match observed annuitization rates in 
real markets. Many authors have tried to solve the so-called annuity puzzle by either 
expanding the life-cycle model or researching the human limitations to properly valuing 
annuities. These studies all acknowledge the annuity puzzle as a general phenomenon. Our 
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experiment among Dutch pension fund participants finds limited preference for utilizing the 
new optionality of partial lump sum take-up at retirement, even though the minimum 
annuitization rate was kept at a high level of 80%. The evidence supports earlier findings of 
the phenomenon being more circumstantial than generally valid. However, the question then 
remains why that is. Do the Dutch not make the same mistakes in valuing annuities as, for 
instance members, of 401(k) plans in the United States? Or do they simply make different 
mistakes and is the decision to annuitize indeed always subject to human biases? Brown et al. 
(2008) suggest that an important problem in the United States is that annuities tend to be 
evaluated through an investment frame rather than a consumption frame. Benartzi et al. 
(2011) argue that pension accrual in lump sums fosters investment framing, while accrual in 
annuities promotes consumption framing. With the latter being the case in the Netherlands, it 
is very possible that the high annuitization rates observed in our experiment result from 
Dutch plan members filtering the decision through a consumption frame. Hence, they would 
be making similar mistakes as US plan members but, from an economist’s point of view, in 
their own best interests, leading to a somewhat reversed annuitization puzzle. Therefore, 
when explaining annuity demand, one needs to keep in mind not only the underlying human 
biases but also the institutional environment. The idea is that different institutional settings 
can trigger different biases in decision making.  
To test this line of argumentation, we assess the reaction to framing in the unique Dutch 
environment. If the frames work the same way as in the United States, the results would 
significantly support the general applicability of the framing hypothesis and its explanatory 
power with respect to annuity demand. We find the frames do apply to the Dutch case. 
Respondents reacted as behavioral economics (mental accounting and prospect theory) 
predicts. The stronger impact of the investment frames compared to that of the consumption 
frames suggests that respondents were initially not thinking of their pension income as an 
investment product but, rather, in terms of a consumption path. The significance of these 
results is further supported by the fact that this research uses a personalized experiment 
based on actual expected individual pension accruals at retirement, minimizing alienation 
bias. Rigorous testing for other explanations possibly outstripping the framing effects 
support the results. 
Our conclusion is therefore that annuity demand generally depends significantly on framing 
effects. The effect framing has, however, depends on the institutional environment, which 
predefines the perspective through which individuals filter annuities. To settle this issue, 
future research, based on studies across countries with varied pension plan diversity, is 
needed.  
6.2 Professional intervention 
Concerning the introduction of a partial lump sum pension option in the Netherlands, 
important practical questions arise for policy makers and pension professionals. Who will 
use the lump sum option and to what extent? How steerable is the demand for the lump sum 
option? Should one intervene in the decision making processes of individuals and, if so, how 
should one intervene when recognizing the variety and heterogeneity in individuals’ 
backgrounds and preferences? We find that the majority of plan members would use a partial 
lump sum payment if it were implemented as in the experiment. However, given insights 
from academia, it is likely that many plan members will fall victim to biased decision making, 
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leading to overall welfare loss. At the same time, this loss is contrasted by the welfare gains of 
those able to reach higher utility levels due to greater individualization. From a social 
planner’s perspective, there is a delicate trade-off between freedom of choice and loss of 
welfare. An optimal solution minimizes the potential welfare loss from biased decision 
making, providing a certain level in freedom of choice (or a maximum degree of freedom for a 
given level of welfare).  
To understand the possible origins of welfare loss, it is important to know which biases apply 
to the decision to annuitize and how they can be avoided. This is where framing and default 
settings open up a whole box of tools to pension professionals. Our research confirms, first, 
how the decision to annuitize is subject to mental accounting and framing. Second, it shows 
how individuals are sensitive to framing and defaults and can thereby be actively steered in 
predictable directions. Additionally, the analysis not only predicts overall behavior but also 
shows how one could deal with heterogeneity. The study shows how frames can have 
opposite effects for different age cohorts or genders, for instance. The greater the knowledge 
of these different sensitivities in combination with a good understanding of the underlying 
heterogeneities, the more framing can be helpful in steering individual choice to minimize 
overall welfare loss. 
Two major concerns remain regarding active framing and defaults. First, the fact that 
individuals are steered in predictable directions does not imply they are being steered in a 
direction that improves utility. This paper shows that annuity choice is subject to human 
biases in decision making and that choice can be influenced by actively playing on these 
biases. Future research will have to define what is optimal for a heterogeneous population, 
that is, the directions in which different people are to be steered. Second, any kind of framing 
or nudging implies that people are pushed into making a choice they would initially not have 
made. One could argue that the Dutch pension system, with its paternalistic way of arranging 
for retirement income, interferes even more severely with freedom of choice. The point here, 
however, is that framing and defaults setting interfere with freedom of choice without 
making it transparent to individuals. Even then, advocates of libertarian paternalism argue 
that framing is still superior to a purely paternalistic approach because it does not take away 
choice from those who show stable preferences, whereas it minimizes welfare loss from 
those hampered by biased decision making. The reach of steering by framing and default 
settings ultimately depends on where the Dutch pension community finds the best balance 
between paternalism and liberalism. 
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper presents the first results of testing the framing hypothesis in the institutional 
environment of the Netherlands, where people are used to full annuitization. The 
experiment is organized around the very likely introduction of the choice option at 
retirement to allocate their accrued pension between a life annuity and a partial lump 
sum. The experimental setting is realistic as the choice menu is based on the respondents’ 
real projected pension accrual and on their own pension plans. Dutch plan members 
generally welcome the partial lump sum option over full annuitization. 
We find strong evidence of joint effects of combining investment and consumption frames 
with gain and loss frames. These sensitivities potentially may be used for professional 
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intervention for steering individual decision-making in pension choices into an expert-
based direction. However the experiment also clarifies that a general application of 
frames as such may not be effective in case of heterogeneity among plan participants. In 
particular we found that framing may differ as to gender, age, risk attitude and debt 
position. Before implementing active framing, further research is needed to improve the 
tuning of interventions to individuals’ variety in proneness for framing.  
The average lump sum take-up is quite modest when one recognizes the Netherlands is 
an over-annuitized country. It is plausible that the specific institutional environment of a 
country play a key role in how individuals appreciate annuities. Future research, based on 
studies across countries with varied pension plan diversity, is needed to capture the country-
specific component in annuity demand.  
Our overall conclusion is therefore that annuity demand generally depends significantly on 
framing effects. The effect framing has, however, depends on the institutional environment, 
which predefines the perspective through which individuals filter annuities.  
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Appendix A Tables 
 
Table A.1 Logit Regression Partial Lump Sum Choice 
Specification: A B Cut? D E 
VARIABLES Frames only Economic Behavioral Combined Best 
      
dflat -0.46*** -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.54*** -0.44*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
dhigh 0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.09 
 (0.47) (0.95) (0.97) (0.81) (0.61) 
low_high 1.38*** 1.54*** 1.39*** 1.52*** 1.34*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
high_low 1.85*** 1.95*** 1.94*** 1.95*** 1.89*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
male  0.01 0.24* 0.10 0.03 
  (0.97) (0.09) (0.56) (0.86) 
age  -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
life_expectancy  0.00  0.00  
  (0.60)  (0.70)  
married  0.21  0.24 0.39* 
  (0.37)  (0.32) (0.06) 
was_married  0.31  0.39 0.59** 
  (0.28)  (0.19) (0.02) 
income_part_time  -0.00  -0.00  
  (0.46)  (0.59)  
annuity  0.00**  0.00** 0.00*** 
  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.00) 
children  0.13*  0.14* 0.11* 
  (0.06)  (0.05) (0.10) 
zhealth  -0.18**  -0.16** -0.07 
  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.28) 
zwealth  -0.12  -0.16** -0.10 
  (0.13)  (0.04) (0.16) 
long_debt  0.44***  0.49*** 0.35** 
  (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) 
zrisk_general  0.16**  0.17** 0.18** 
  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.02) 
stocks  -0.49***  -0.46** -0.47*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) 
zdiscount  0.46***  0.43*** 0.41*** 










red_numbers   0.28* 0.07  
   (0.07) (0.73)  
contact_fund   -0.02** -0.01 -0.01* 
   (0.02) (0.16) (0.06) 
zinvolve   0.10 0.06  
   (0.13) (0.41)  
zf_literacy   0.12 0.13  
   (0.12) (0.17)  
zp_literacy   0.03 0.01  
   (0.69) (0.86)  
zlit_conf   -0.05 -0.00  
   (0.51) (0.96)  
zdecision_conf   -0.14* -0.11 -0.16** 
   (0.07) (0.19) (0.04) 
zoverload_cogn   0.22*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 
   (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
ztrust2   -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 
   (0.64) (0.25) (0.20) 
zknow_arrange   0.15** 0.15* 0.17** 
   (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Constant -0.90*** 0.11 0.63 0.05 0.43 
 (0.00) (0.91) (0.20) (0.96) (0.41) 
      
Observations 1381 1004 1235 1990 1229 
Prob > Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo-R2 0.0473 0.126 0.0808 0.147 0.134 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 




Table A.2 Ordered Probit Regression: Step 1  
Specification: A B C D E 
VARIABLES Frames Econ Behavioral Combined Best 
CG -0.21*** -0.21** -0.24*** -0.22** -0.22** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
CL -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.32*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IG 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.07 
 (0.49) (0.44) (0.83) (0.39) (0.42) 
IL -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.44*** -0.36*** -0.37*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
low_high 0.58*** 0.55*** 0.59*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
high_low 1.00*** 1.03*** 1.06*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
male  -0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 
  (0.49) (0.60) (0.32) (0.33) 
age  -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
life_expectancy  -0.01  -0.01* -0.01* 
  (0.21)  (0.05) (0.06) 
married  0.09  0.12 0.11 
  (0.34)  (0.19) (0.24) 
was_married  0.20*  0.23** 0.23** 
  (0.08)  (0.04) (0.05) 
income_part_time  0.00  0.00 0.00*** 
  (0.92)  (0.87) (0.00) 
replacement  -0.22  -0.31  
  (0.66)  (0.54)  
annuity  0.00  0.00  
  (0.44)  (0.45)  
children  0.05*  0.05* 0.05* 
  (0.08)  (0.08) (0.07) 
zhealth  0.01  0.02  
  (0.78)  (0.45)  
zwealth  -0.07**  -0.07** -0.07** 
  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) 
other_annuities  0.04    
  (0.56)    
long_debt  0.15**  0.15** 0.16** 
  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.02) 
short_debt  0.09    
  (0.29)    
zrisk_general  0.10***  0.08*** 0.08*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) 
stocks  0.05    









zdiscount  0.11***  0.11*** 0.11*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
      
      
red_numbers   0.23*** 0.11 0.10 
   (0.00) (0.13) (0.15) 
newsletter   -0.03   
   (0.82)   
contact_fund   -0.00   
   (0.60)   
zinvolve   0.00   
   (0.99)   
zp_literacy   0.02 0.03  
   (0.45) (0.30)  
zf_literacy   0.04   
   (0.26)   
zlit_conf   0.08** 0.06* 0.07** 
   (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) 
zdecision_conf   0.00   
   (0.97)   
zoverload_cogn   0.04 0.06* 0.06* 
   (0.28) (0.07) (0.05) 
ztrust2   -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 
   (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
zknow_pension   -0.04 -0.06*  
   (0.26) (0.07)  
zknow_arrange   0.09*** 0.08** 0.07** 
   (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) 
Cut 1 0.46*** -0.57 -0.16 -0.79* -0.66 
 (0.00) (0.23) (0.49) (0.10) (0.10) 
Cut 2 0.85*** -0.14 0.24 -0.36 -0.24 
 (0.00) (0.77) (0.31) (0.44) (0.56) 
Cut 3 1.35*** 0.39 0.77*** 0.17 0.30 
 (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.72) (0.47) 
Cut 4 1.56*** 0.59 0.96*** 0.38 0.50 
 (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.42) (0.21) 
Observations 2234 1591 1991 1651 1652 
Prob > Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo-R2 0.0269 0.0522 0.0451 0.0570 0.0558 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Dependent variable: step1 choice (1 to 5); ordered_numbers probit 
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Table A.3 Ordered Probit: Step 1 with Interaction and Control 
Specification: A B C D 
Interaction of frame with: Male Age Long_Debt Risk_Gen.  
VARIABLES     
     
CG 0.05 -0.11 -0.59*** -0.22** 
 (0.80) (0.32) (0.00) (0.01) 
CL -0.24 -0.21* -0.58*** -0.34*** 
 (0.17) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
IG 0.37** 0.23** -0.12 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.53) (0.52) 
IL -0.04 -0.19 -0.68*** -0.37*** 
 (0.82) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
low_high 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
high_low 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CG × Interaction -0.36* -0.24* 0.54*** -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.01) (0.83) 
CL × Interaction -0.10 -0.22 0.37* 0.17** 
 (0.63) (0.12) (0.06) (0.05) 
IG × Interaction -0.40** -0.35** 0.29 0.14 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.17) (0.14) 
IL x Interaction -0.44** -0.36** 0.44** 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.52) 
male 0.19 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.17) (0.41) (0.37) (0.37) 
age -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
life_expectancy -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) 
married 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11 
 (0.25) (0.31) (0.34) (0.25) 
was_married 0.23** 0.20* 0.22* 0.22* 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
income_part_time 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
children 0.05* 0.05* 0.06** 0.05* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) 
zwealth -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
long_debt 0.16** 0.14** -0.17 0.15** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.21) (0.02) 
zrisk_general 0.08** 0.08** 0.09*** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.86) 
zdiscount 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
red_numbers 0.10 0.10  0.11 
 (0.16) (0.18)  (0.14) 
zlit_conf 0.07* 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
zoverload_cogn 0.06* 0.07** 0.06* 0.07** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
ztrust2 -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
zknow_arrange 0.07** 0.07** 0.06* 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) 
Constant -0.46 -0.09 -0.88** -0.66 
 (0.26) (0.83) (0.03) (0.10) 
     
Observations 1652 1652 1652 1652 
Prob > Chi2 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo-R2 0.0575 0.0587 0.0557 0.0573 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Dependent variable: step1 choice (1 to 5); ordered_numbers probit 
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Table A.4 Ordered Probit: Step1, Interaction Only 
Specification: A B C D 




VARIABLES     
     
CG -0.32** -0.08 -0.50*** -0.21*** 
 (0.01) (0.36) (0.00) (0.01) 
CL -0.48*** -0.19** -0.60*** -0.37*** 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
IG 0.09 0.20** -0.09 0.02 
 (0.44) (0.02) (0.53) (0.75) 
IL -0.28** -0.17* -0.58*** -0.39*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
low_high 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
high_low 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.04*** 0.98*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CG × Interaction 0.15 -0.25** 0.43*** 0.09 
 (0.25) (0.02) (0.00) (0.13) 
CL × Interaction 0.18 -0.34*** 0.39*** 0.17*** 
 (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IG × Interaction -0.06 -0.34*** 0.17 0.22*** 
 (0.65) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) 
IL × Interaction -0.15 -0.43*** 0.24* 0.12** 
 (0.22) (0.00) (0.08) (0.04) 
Constant 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
Observations 2234 2234 2000 2234 
Prob > Chi2 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo-R2 0.0278 0.0335 0.0340 0.0323 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 




Appendix B Definitions of variables in survey 
 









Captures how much 
lump sum is taken 
in first step of 
experiment 
1,2,3,4,5 for a lump sum 
take up of (as relative 
size accrual):  
0; 0.05; 0.1; 0.15; 0.2  
  
High-low 
Indicates if any of 
the 5 high-low 
allocations was 
chosen 
1=yes, 0=no   
Low-high 
Indicates if any of 
the 5 low-high 
allocations was 
chosen 
1=yes, 0=no   
Framing Variables (explanatory / independent) 
CG consumption gain  1=yes, 0=no - 
See Error! Reference 
source not found.& 
section 2  
CL  consumption loss 1=yes, 0=no - 
See Error! Reference 
source not found.& 
section 2 
IG investment gain 1=yes, 0=no + 
See Error! Reference 
source not found.& 
section 2 
IL  Investment loss  1=yes, 0=no - 
See Error! Reference 
source not found.& 
section 2 
dflat  
Default = 0 ls & no 
high_low 
1=yes, 0=no - See section 2 
dhigh  
Default=0.1 lump 
sum & high-low 
1=yes, 0=no + See section 2 
n  neutral frame 1=yes, 0=no / See section 2 
Rational / Standard Economic Theory Variables (explanatory / independent / control) 
age Respondents age in years - 
Elderly are more risk 
averse, seek longevity 
insurance 
male Indicates gender 1=male, 0=fem + 
Men are more risk seeking 
and confident in financial 
skills 
Married / was 
married 
Two separate 
dummies to cover 
married, unmarried, 
widowed 
For both: 1=yes, 0=no Married + 
Married engage in 
intrafamily longevity risk 
pooling 
Income_full_ time 
Full time equivalent 
Income 
in € - 
High income earners need 
less additional liquidity 
Part_time_ factor 
Working hours in % 
of full time 
0.1-1.2 - See income 






in € - See income 
other_annuities 
Is any annuitized 
wealth expected 
outside the plan 
1=yes; 0=no + 
Already annuitized wealth 
increases demand for 
liquidity 
wealth 








7= above 150k 
- 
Need for liquidity 
decreases with wealth 
houseowner  1=yes; 0=no + 
Illiquidity of housing 
more lump sum 
house_paid 
Expects to have 
house paid off until 
retirement 
1=yes; 0=no - 
When house paid off, no 
need to pay debt with 





1=yes; 0=no   
long_debt 
Has loans with 
duration>10Y 
1=yes; 0=no + 
Lump sum used to pay off 
loans 
stocks Holds stocks 1=yes; 0=no +/- 
More risk seeking  less 
annuitization / Higher 
finance. sophistication 
value annuities correctly  
risk_general 
Self indicated general 
risk appetite 
1=always avoid risks, 
2=avoid risks, 
3=neutral, 4=take 
risks, 5=always take 
risks 
- 
More Risk averse  value 
longevity insurance 
risk_aversion_ life 
Life time income 
gamble  
1=not risk – 4=very 
risk av. 
- See above 
discount 
willingness to delay 
lottery payout 
(patience) 
1=very low – 5=very 
high 
+ 
Impatient respondents or 
heavy discounters prefer 
lump sums 
children  Number of children 
1=1; 2=2 
3=3 
4= more than 3 
+ 
Children as proxy for 
bequest motive  more 
lump sum 
health 
Self indicated general 
condition 
1=poor  
2,3,4,     
5= very good 
- 
Good health increases 
demand for longevity 
insurance 
life_expectancy 
Self indicated life 
expectancy 
In years (age) - 
Higher life expectancy  
more longevity insurance 
Behavioral Variables (independent / explanatory / control) 
red_numbers 
Uses more than 5 
times/year credit 
on cash account 
1=yes; 0=no + 
Very costly form of credit 
as irrational as 
underannuitization 









Higher educated will find 
it easier to value the 
annuity and have less need 





Appendix C Questionnaire 
 








More involved have less 





1=yes; 0=no - 
Different proxy for 
involvement 
contact_fund 
Number of contact 
with fund in last  
# of contacts - 





& fund trust  
0-1 - 
More trust  rely on fund 










1,2,3,4,5 - See f-literacy 
Lit_confidence 
# of f_lit. questions 
confident to have 
answered correctly 
0,1,2,3,4,5 + 
Overconfidence may lead 
to “underannuitization) 
decision_conf 




Confidence is associated 
with understanding 






Overload  LS appears as 
less complicated (more 
attractive)  
know_pension 




Well informed appreciated 
longevity insurance 
know_arrange 
Knows enough to 
arrange well for 
own pension 
1,2,3,4,5 - See above 
